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Abstract
This article reviews the social psychological literature on attentional focus and causal attributions as
they apply to social phobia. Excessive self-focused attention is increased by physiological arousal,
interferes with task performance under some conditions, increases the probability of internal attributions, and intensifies emotional reactions. Social anxiety is also associated with a reversal of the selfserving bias for causal attributions. Implications of these findings for the maintenance and treatment
of social phobia are discussed.

Modern specialization within psychology often inhibits the cross-fertilization of ideas between clinical psychology and other specialties. Personality and social psychologists can
contribute to our understanding of clinical syndromes by providing a knowledge base of
the psychological processes and characteristics of normal individuals. Clinical researchers
can then examine whether disturbed individuals act in similar ways under similar circumstances. Such comparisons may increase our understanding of behavior disorders and suggest possible interventions.
This paper examines how knowledge of two areas of social psychological research—
attentional focus and causal attributions—can enhance our understanding of social phobia.
Excessive self-focused attention has been implicated in the development and maintenance
of social anxiety by a number of theorists (Hartman, 1983; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). This
paper will review the relationship between attentional focus and physiological arousal,
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performance, attributions, and emotional reactivity. We will also examine how the causal
attribution patterns of socially anxious individuals differ from those of nonanxious persons and consider what implications this may have for the maintenance and treatment of
social phobia.
Self-Awareness and Social Anxiety
Twenty years ago Argyle and Williams ( 1969) postulated that during any social interaction
the individual must be aware of both the self and the other. If there is not an appropriate
balance of these two perspectives, attempts at social interaction will be ineffective and may
result in undesirable social outcomes. Sarason (1975) has suggested that for socially anxious individuals, this balance is disrupted by a pattern of excessive negative self-referent
thinking known as anxious self-preoccupation. Indeed, studies have found that social anxiety is associated with high frequencies of self-focused thoughts (e.g., Hope, Heimberg,
Zollo, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987; Johnson & Glass, in press). However, little is known about
the role of excessive self-focused attention in social anxiety. As will be seen below, social
psychologists have examined the causes and consequences of excessive self-focused attention in nonanxious individuals. The results raise some interesting hypotheses about the
relationship between attentional focus and social phobia. Before reviewing specific studies,
the various types of self-focus will be defined.
Self-focused attention can result from both situational and dispositional factors (Buss,
1980). Situational self-focused attention, known as self-awareness, may be induced by the
presence of an audience, a mirror, or a video camera. The use of an audience to induce selfawareness is most relevant to social anxiety, especially since an “audience” may be defined
as the presence of one other person (e.g., Baumeister, 1984). The Self-Consciousness Scale
(SCS) was developed to measure dispositional tendencies to focus attention on the self,
referred to as self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Three factors are represented in the SCS: (a) private self-consciousness, an awareness of one’s own thoughts and
feelings, (b) public self-consciousness, a general awareness of the self as a social object, and
(c) social anxiety, discomfort in the presence of others. Self-awareness and self-consciousness
have been studied extensively and appear to have similar effects on behavior (Buss, 1980).
Public self-consciousness is thought to be more closely related to social anxiety than
private self-consciousness. In fact, a number of researchers have proposed that social anxiety will not occur in the absence of public self-consciousness (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein, 1979;
Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Although data from our laboratory have not supported this assertion (Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Hope, Heimberg, & Grochowski, 1988), public selfconsciousness was positively associated with various measures of social anxiety. Furthermore, private self-consciousness appeared to be related to social anxiety via public selfconsciousness. Given the relatively large overlap between public and private self-consciousness
in some samples (r = .54, Turner, 1978), including a sample of social phobics (r = .53, Hope
& Heimberg, 1988), the effects of both types of self-consciousness will be considered below.
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Self-Awareness and Arousal
Several researchers have examined the relationship between attentional focus and physiological arousal. Wegner and Giuliano ( 1980) hypothesized that an increase in salient internal stimuli, such as heart rate acceleration during physical exertion, would increase selffocused attention. They demonstrated that fast running in place led to self-focus, presumably because the salient physiological stimuli served to focus attention inward. When
McDonald, Harris, and Maher (1983) proposed that it was the unusualness of running in
place, not physiological arousal, that resulted in increased self-awareness, Wegner and
Guiliano (1983) replicated their previous findings, controlling for unusualness of the activity. Subjects who had just ascended stairs (physiologically aroused) were more self-aware
than students who had just descended the same stairs (not aroused).
Like Wegner and Giuliano (1980, 1983), Fenigstein and Carver (1978) posited that
awareness of physiological processes (e.g., heart beat) increases self-awareness. In their
study, subjects were assigned to one of four conditions: heart monitoring apparatus with
audio-feedback, heart monitoring apparatus without audio-feedback, no heart monitoring
with background noise, no heart monitoring–no background noise. All four groups were
then asked to make attributions about their responsibility for the outcome of various hypothetical situations. The no-noise, noise, and heart rate monitoring without audio-feedback groups rated their personal responsibility equally, while the heart monitoring with
audio-feedback group attributed significantly more responsibility to themselves than the
other three groups. Fenigstein and Carver concluded that the presence of information concerning one’s own physiological state led to a state of self-focus, which in turn resulted in
self-attributions of responsibility. (The relationship between attentional focus and attributions will be discussed further below.)
Although it appears that physiological arousal (or awareness of physiological processes) leads to self-focused attention, the opposite does not appear to be the case. Carver
and Scheier (1981) found that increased self-awareness (induced by a mirror) did not result
in increased physiological arousal (as measured by Palmar Sweat Index). However, Carver
and Scheier measured arousal while subjects copied German text. Perhaps heightened selfawareness would have an impact on arousal in a more complex or evaluative task (such as
public speaking, heterosocial interaction, or job interview).
The relationship between physiological arousal and attentional focus has important implications for social phobia. Many social phobics experience intense physiological arousal
when exposed to anxiety-provoking events (Borkovec, Stone, O’Brien, & Kaloupek, 1974),
and they may be painfully aware of their arousal. In fact, social phobics give very accurate
estimates of their heart rate arousal in phobic situations, more so than other phobic individuals Johansson & Öst, 1982). Thus these data suggest that physiological arousal induces
self-focused attention in social phobics who are then vulnerable to its effects on task performance and emotional reactivity (see below). However, since social phobics vary in the
degree of arousal they experience in their phobic situations (Heimberg, Hope, Dodge, &
Becker, 1988; Öst, Jerremalm, & Johansson, 1981), excessive self-focused attention may be
most problematic for those social phobics who experience more intense physiological reactions.
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Self-Awareness and Task Performance
According to limited-capacity attentional models (e.g., Wine, 1980) excessive self-awareness
should result in performance decrements because the increase in self-attention leaves insufficient attentional resources to focus adequately on the task at hand. Indeed, in work
with test anxious subjects, Wine (1971) has demonstrated that an anxious response to testing situations is associated with excessive test-irrelevant thinking, and that as test-anxious
individuals are taught to focus more on the test, their performance improves. Similarly,
subjects instructed to focus on a concept-attainment task performed better than subjects
instructed to focus on themselves during the task (Brockner, 1979). Brockner also included
the SCS and reported that high self-consciousness (total SCS scale score) was associated
with poorer task performance, particularly when that performance occurred in the presence of a mirror.
Baumeister ( 1984) reported a series of five experiments on the effects of self-consciousness
and pressure on performance in a motor-coordination task. In the first two, self-attention
(manipulated by instructions to self-focus) was detrimental to performance. In the third
experiment, subjects high in private self-consciousness performed more poorly than low
private self-conscious subjects, a finding which is consistent with the notion that selfattention is detrimental to task performance. On the other hand, subjects low in public selfconsciousness performed more poorly than high public self-conscious subjects, especially
when told to focus on themselves. In the fourth experiment, male subjects were led to believe that they had either done better (low pressure) or worse (high pressure) than a female
confederate on the first trial of a task. High public self-conscious subjects did better than
all other subjects, especially when being observed by the female confederate. Baumeister
concluded that individuals low in dispositional public self-consciousness were more susceptible to choking under pressure because they were less accustomed to performing under the pressure that is induced by being characteristically self-aware (high public selfconscious). However, an alternative interpretation of these results deserves mention. Subjects high in public self-consciousness, who by definition are very aware of themselves as
social objects, may have been motivated to make a favorable impression and found the
situation (performance of a motor-coordination task) a riskless medium in which to operate. In other words, the situation was not threatening enough for the detrimental effects of
self-focusing to influence high public self-conscious subjects. Baumeister’s final experiment supports the latter explanation. He approached individuals playing videogames in
an arcade and offered to pay for their game if he could observe them. Although subjects
were instructed to do the best they could, their scores decreased an average of 25 percent
compared to pre-experiment levels. According to Buss ( 1980), the presence of the experimenter should have induced public self-awareness in the subjects. Also, the ambiguity and
unusualness of the situation (being approached by a stranger who wants to watch your
performance for his research) likely made it somewhat threatening. This combination of
high public self-awareness and social threat inhibited performance.
Stephenson and Wicklund ( 1984) examined the effects of self-consciousness on subjects’
ability to guide a blindfolded confederate through a maze task. The subject sat facing the
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confederate so she was forced to adopt the confederate’s perspective when giving instructions (left, right , etc.). High private self-conscious women made fewer perspective-taking
errors than low private self-conscious women.
Obviously there is conflicting evidence about whether self-focused attention facilitates
or debilitates performance. An early study by Liebling and Shaver (1973) may help explain
the mixed findings. Liebling and Shaver had subjects copy Swedish prose in the presence
or absence of a mirror. They also manipulated level of evaluation by telling half of the
subjects that the task represented a measure of intelligence. The presence of the mirror
facilitated performance in the low evaluation condition and reduced performance under
evaluative conditions. Thus it appears that self-awareness is only detrimental when one’s
motivation to perform well is high.
In summary, it appears that instructions to focus on the task at hand facilitate performance. The presence of self-focusing stimuli such as a mirror are detrimental to performance but only if the subject is somehow vulnerable due to another factor such as social
evaluation. Dispositional self-consciousness, on the other hand, has been inconsistently
related to task performance. In some cases, high public or private self-consciousness is associated with superior performance, in other cases, with inferior performance. However,
none of the studies cited above examined the effects of self-consciousness on performance
at various levels of another variable such as self-esteem or social anxiety. Perhaps like mirrorinduced self-focused attention, the effects of dispositional self-consciousness are seen only
in combination with a third variable. Recent data from our laboratory indirectly support
this hypothesis. Hope et al. (1988) found a positive association between public self-consciousness
and social anxiety (both measured with the SCS) but only for socially anxious subjects.
Public self-consciousness and social anxiety were unrelated in nonanxious subjects.
Burgio, Merluzzi, and Pryor (1986) also demonstrated that self-focused attention is detrimental only under some conditions. In this study male subjects, prescreened to be neither
extremely high or low in social anxiety, interacted with a female confederate over the telephone either in the presence (high self-awareness) or absence (low self-awareness) of a
video camera. Half of the subjects had high expectancies for success, half low expectancies.
Low expectancy/high self-aware subjects talked less and had shorter conversations than
low expectancy/low self-aware subjects. Furthermore, low expectancy subjects were rated
as less skillful by judges than high expectancy subjects, but only when the video camera
was present. High and low expectancy groups did not differ on skill ratings in the absence
of the camera. In other words, self-focusing stimuli disrupted the performance of subjects,
but only if they already lacked confidence in their social abilities.
Given that, by definition, social phobics have low expectancies for success in social situations, one would expect that excessive self-focused attention would have detrimental
effects on their performance in those situations. To our knowledge, only one study has
examined attentional focus and performance among social phobics. Hope and Heimberg
(1988) found that high public self-consciousness was associated with poorer performance
on a behavioral test among social phobics awaiting treatment. Again, by definition the social phobics lacked confidence in their ability to perform socially and this, in combination
with high public self-consciousness, appears to have disrupted their performance.
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Self-Awareness and Emotional Reactivity
Several studies have looked at the relationship between emotional reactions and selfconsciousness. Scheier and Carver ( 1977) found that both high private self-consciousness
and the presence of a mirror intensified subjects self-reported reactions to pictures of nude
women or violent atrocities. Mirror presence or high private self-consciousness also predicted greater elation and depression subsequent to reading affect-laden sentences. The
authors concluded that mirror-induced self-awareness and self-consciousness resulted in
increased attention to affective states, thereby intensifying self-report of affective reactions.
Fenigstein (1979) extended these findings by examining the effects of self-focused attention on affective reactions to positive and negative social interactions. In the first of two
studies, high public self-conscious women were more sensitive to interpersonal rejection.
He suggested that attention focused on the self as a social object increased the salience of
rejection and its subsequent implications for self-esteem. In the second experiment, subjects were given either favorable or unfavorable feedback in an interview situation, and
self-awareness was manipulated by exposing half the subjects to a mirror. Increasing selfawareness (mirror present) heightened negative responses to negative feedback and
tended to increase positive reactions to positive feedback.
The results of the Scheier and Carver (1977) and Fenigstein (1979) studies suggest that
self-awareness intensifies emotional reactions. A key aspect of social phobia is avoidance
of noxious stimuli, that is, anxiety-provoking social interactions. If self-focused attention
serves to heighten such aversive reactions, one would expect that self-focused attention
would relate to avoidance behavior among social phobics.
Focus of Attention and Causal Attributions
A number of studies have found that the direction of attentional focus influences causal
attributions. For example, if subjects are instructed to focus their attention toward one of
the actors in a situation, they will attribute more responsibility for the outcome of that
situation to that actor than to others in the situation (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Similarly, one
would expect that self-focused individuals would make more self-attributions than nonself-focused individuals. A number of studies support this hypothesis.
Duval and Wicklund (1973) found that subjects facing a mirror (high self-awareness
condition) attributed more responsibility to themselves for the outcome of hypothetical
situations than subjects who were not facing a mirror (low self-awareness condition). In
another study, high private self-conscious subjects attributed more responsibility to themselves for the outcome of hypothetical situations than did low private self-conscious subjects (Buss & Scheier, 1976). Public self-consciousness did not effect attribution patterns.
However, as Buss and Scheier noted, the hypothetical situations used were not particularly
social in nature.
Fenigstein (1984) demonstrated that in social situations public, but not private, selfconsciousness influences expectancies for the outcome of situations. Groups of subjects
were told that one of them had been randomly chosen for a demonstration for the group.
The demonstration was described as enjoyable and interesting (positive) for half of the
subjects and as discomforting (negative) to the other half. Subjects rated the likelihood that
they would be chosen. Whether the expected outcome was positive or negative, subjects
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high in public self-consciousness rated themselves as more likely to be chosen for the
demonstration, a phenomenon dubbed “over-perception of self as target.” Private selfconsciousness was not related to this phenomenon.
Thus it appears that self-focused attention is associated with internal causal attributions.
However, the relationship between self-awareness and self-attributions may be mediated
by a third variable—the success or failure of the outcome. In a study by Federoff and Harvey (1976), subjects delivered relaxation instructions to confederates in the presence or absence of a video camera. A meter provided false feedback clearly indicating success or
failure of the instructions. When subjects were self-aware (presence of a camera), they
made internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure. In fact, when
they expected success but failed, they tended to blame the confederate. Non-self-aware
subjects did not differ in their attributions for success and failure. Federoff and Harvey
suggested that in such an unfamiliar situation the presence of the camera aroused subjects’
self-esteem concerns which resulted in a self-protective attributional pattern known as the
self-serving bias (see below).
It should be noted that one study failed to find a relationship between attentional focus
and attributions. Ellis and Holmes (1982) instructed subjects to focus either on themselves
or on an interviewer during an interaction and then had them rate to what extent their own
behavior, the situation, and the personality of the interviewer were responsible for the interviewer’s behavior. It was predicted that the subject’s focus of attention would determine
causal attribution. However, the focus of attention manipulation did not influence causal
attributions for the behavior of the interviewer.
In summary, it appears that self-focused attention is related to over-perception of the
self as target and self-attributions. Thus social phobics’ over-perception of themselves as
the focus of others’ observation (noted by Butler, this issue) may reflect excessive selffocused attention. Furthermore, if social phobics are self-focused, they are likely to attribute the outcome of social situations to themselves . Given that socially anxious individuals
have a selective memory for negative interpersonal feedback (O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977)
and are overly sensitive to such feedback (Smith & Sarason, 1975), these self-attributions
will often be for failure.
Causal Attributions and Social Anxiety
Over the years social psychologists have identified a phenomenon known as the “self-serving
bias” in causal attributions. According to the self-serving bias, people tend to attribute success to internal causes such as skill or ability and to attribute failure to external causes such
as bad luck or task difficulty (cf., Miller & Ross, 1975). Zelen (1987) proposed that a reversal
of the self-serving bias may underlie what he calls the “performance neuroses,” a group of disorders which includes social anxiety. A number of studies suggests that the self-presentational
concerns of socially anxious individuals cause reversal of the self-serving bias.
Using a methodology similar to the one employed by Federoff and Harvey (1976) in the
study described above, Arkin, Appelman, and Burger (1980) compared the attributions for
success or failure of high and low socially anxious subjects. Subjects acted as therapists in
a mock desensitization session and received false feedback on the success or failure of their
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intervention. Level of evaluation was manipulated by having half the subjects believe their
report of the session would be reviewed by a committee of psychologists immediately after
the intervention and that they would be present at the review, while the other subjects
were told a committee would review their report at a later date and that they would not
be present at the review. All subjects were videotaped (comparable to the high self-aware
condition in Federoff and Harvey). Nonanxious subjects followed the typical self-serving
bias. They attributed more responsibility to themselves for positive than for negative outcomes, a replication of the high self-aware condition in Federoff and Harvey. However,
socially anxious subjects did the reverse. They took more responsibility for failure than
success, particularly when evaluation was imminent. Arkin et al. suggested that the anxious subjects adopted a “cost” orientation toward the committee evaluation. They felt the
committee would be less displeased if they took responsibility for the failure. On the other
hand, the nonanxious subjects adopted a “reward” orientation; if they took responsibility
for a positive event and made it seem they had nothing to do with a negative event, they
would impress the committee.
Teglasi and colleagues (Teglasi & Fagin, 1984; Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982) have produced
additional data suggesting that social anxiety is associated with reversals of the self-serving
bias. Teglasi and Hoffman ( 1982) compared subjects who responded to an advertisement
recruiting shy people placed in a university paper with volunteers from a psychology class.
The subjects made attributional ratings for social and task-oriented scenarios which had
either positive or negative outcomes. Shy subjects took more responsibility for negative
outcomes and less responsibility for positive outcomes than nonshy subjects. Interestingly,
this attributional pattern was only found for the social scenarios, suggesting the reversal
of the self-serving bias is situation-specific. Using a different methodology, Teglasi and
Fagin (1984) essentially replicated their earlier findings. Girodo, Dotzenroth, and Stein (1981)
also reported that high but not low social self-esteem was associated with a reversal of the
self-serving bias when subjects made attributions for the success and failure of heterosocial
events.
One study (Miller & Arkowitz, 1977) failed to support the notion that social anxiety
influences causal attributions for social outcomes. High and low socially anxious male subjects were asked to have two five-minute conversations with a female confederate, who
was instructed to be either warm or cold. Miller and Arkowitz hypothesized that high socially anxious individuals would attribute failure (confederate coldness) to themselves and
success (confederate warmth) to the situation, but that low socially anxious subjects would
do the reverse. However, the required interaction effect was not significant.
Miller and Arkowitz’s study differed from the studies that did find reversals of the selfserving bias in that it utilized actual interactions (rather than written scenarios) without
concrete feedback on success or failure (unlike Arkin et al., 1980). There is evidence that,
under such conditions, anxious subjects may not adequately perceive the differences between friendly and aloof confederates. Heimberg and colleagues (Heimberg, Acerra, &
Holstein, 1985) found that socially anxious subjects failed to distinguish between similar
and dissimilar potential interaction partners, although a preference for similar others had
been repeatedly demonstrated in nonanxious subjects (Bryne, 1971). In another study,
Hope, Heimberg, and Klein (in press) asked high and low socially anxious women to recall
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information about their interaction partner and the content of the conversation following
a moderately structured heterosocial interaction. Anxious subjects recalled less information and made more recall errors than nonanxious subjects. Both of these studies suggest that exposure to an anxiety-provoking interaction disrupts the social information
processing of anxious individuals. Thus, Miller and Arkowitz’s subjects may have failed
to distinguish between an aloof and friendly confederate. Consequently, their attributions
did not differ for the two types of interactions. Unfortunately, Miller and Arkowitz did not
provide adequate detail in their report to examine the validity of this hypothesis.
Implications for Social Phobia
In summary, it appears that self-focused attention: (a) is increased by physiological arousal,
(b) interferes with task performance if the person is somehow made vulnerable by another
factor such as low self-esteem or low expectancies, (c) may increase the probability of internal attributions, and (d) intensifies emotional reactions. High social anxiety is associated
with a reversal of the self-serving bias of causal attributions. Applying these concepts to
social phobia leads to the following scenario: Physiological arousal when entering an anxietyprovoking situation leads to increased self-focus and concern that arousal is visible to others (McEwan & Devins, 1983). Given the already low expectancy for success, the social
phobic’s self-focus interferes with his or her performance which may lead to negative feedback from the interaction partner. Even if no negative feedback is given, overperception of
the self as target induced by self-focused attention may cause the social phobic to make
internal attributions for neutral or ambiguous feedback. The less than ideal outcome is then
attributed to himself or herself. Throughout the encounter, increased self-focus heightens
the social phobic’s perception of the aversiveness of the situation which may increase the
probability he or she will avoid similar situations in the future. At any point, increased
physiological arousal would be expected to heighten self-awareness which, in turn, exacerbates the other effects. Finally, any interaction that is perceived as successful would be
discounted by attributing the success to external causes. Thus reversal of the self-serving
bias helps maintain the disorder in spite of experiential evidence disconfirming social phobics’
low expectancies for success. The self-presentational model of social anxiety (Schlenker &
Leary, 1982) may help explain why social phobics engage in this particular attributional style.
According to Schlenker and Leary, social anxiety occurs when a person desires to make
a particular impression but doubts he or she will be successful. Recently, Leary and Atherton (1986) further defined the doubt portion of the model and emphasized the importance
of low self-efficacy in social anxiety. Low self-efficacy, in combination with social phobics’
tendency to overperceive themselves as the focus of others’ attention, may make the reversal of the self-serving bias a viable strategy for impression management. If the individual
fails in a social interaction, others will undoubtedly notice. Therefore it is better to
acknowledge the failure than to make a second blunder by not recognizing the first failure.
If a social interaction proceeds successfully, then the social phobic will not want to take
credit for the success out of fear that others will then expect equally effective performance
in the future. Thus, the reversal of the self-serving bias serves as a self-handicapping strategy designed to minimize the damage to self-presentational goals in the current situation
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and reduce others’ expectancies in future situations. In fact, self-handicapping among the
socially anxious has been reported by a number of researchers (e.g., Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987; Snyder & Smith, 1986).
The importance of attributions in social anxiety is further underscored by studies that
show that the effects of social anxiety are diminished when an external attribution for potential poor performance is provided. For example, telling socially anxious subjects that
background noise would interfere with their conversation with a confederate produced
less heart rate reactivity (change from baseline) during the initial minute of an interaction
than when they were told the noise would not interfere (Leary, 1986). Nonanxious subjects
did not react to the noise manipulation. Subjects giving speeches exhibited fewer speech
dysfluencies when they were told that their arousal was attributable to subliminal noise
compared to subjects for whom the noise explanation was not offered (Olson, 1988). Interestingly, neither study found effects for misattribution on self-report measures of anxiety.
Implications for Treatment of Social Phobia
The issues discussed above have a number of implications for the treatment of social phobia. First, excessive self-focused attention likely contributes to the cognitive and behavioral
deficits associated with the disorder. Therefore, treatment strategies that reduce selffocused attention should be effective interventions. Given that physiological arousal increases self-awareness, interventions aimed at reducing arousal, such as relaxation training and some pharmacotherapies, should be particularly useful with physiologically
reactive social phobics . Alternatively, Hartman ( 1983) has suggested that excessive selffocused attention can be reduced directly by teaching clients strategies that redirect their
attention to the interaction partner(s) or the situation. Secondly, we have noted a number
of cognitive distortions which may be amenable to cognitive-behavioral techniques. These
distortions include overperception of the self as the focus of others’ attention, excessive
internal attributions, particularly for failure, and excessive external attributions for success. The latter distortion , discounting their role in successful social experiences, is particularly dysfunctional in that it does not allow social phobics to gain confidence following
positive interactions. Not only does this help maintain the disorder prior to treatment but
it can sabotage treatment efforts as well by maintaining low expectancies for successful
social interaction. In fact, Alden ( 1987) demonstrated that socially anxious subjects were
unwilling to accept positive feedback following a social interaction and discounted the
feedback by attributing it to unstable factors. Therefore, clinicians must be alert to social
phobics’ tendency to make external or unstable attributions for improvement.
In conclusion, social psychologists’ studies of attentional focus and causal attributions
can facilitate our understanding of social phobia. However, the majority of the studies reviewed in this article utilized analogue populations. Clearly more research is needed with
clinical samples. The work of social psychologists helps us know which questions merit
“attentional focus” and offers tested methodologies to employ in finding the answers.
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